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Abstract:  
Many companies in high technology fields engage with alliance partners to reduce risks, create 
synergies and learn. While the challenges of managing individual alliances are well 
documented, little is known on how to manage several R&D alliances simultaneously. Multiple 
alliance strategies can be observed in several companies engaged in the cross section of 
telecommunication and mobile technology where increased complexity magnifies managerial 
challenges. Drawing on modern portfolio theory, this paper offers a model for managing 
portfolios of R&D alliances. In particular, an analysis of a technology platform leader reveals 
how companies can reduce several types of risks associated with new technology and gain 
synergies by engaging in several alliances simultaneously.  
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1. Introduction 
Firms’ collaborative activities are increasingly considered as potential sources of strategic asset 
access and accumulation (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000). Stipulated 
by a growing body of empirical studies sustaining that leading firms engage in increasing 
numbers of strategic alliances, an emergent research stream has pointed to the urgency of 
studying the challenges of simultaneous management of multiple alliances (e.g. Harbison and 
Pekar, 1998; de Man and Duysters, 2002). To date, the alliance literature has been dominated by 
dyadic relationship issues such as motives, interorganizational learning, individual alliance 
governance, management and assessment (e.g. Ireland et al, 2002). Thereby, substantial 
managerial advice on how to manage individual alliances has been produced (Kale, Dyer and 
Singh, 2001). An emergent alliance research strand has initiated the study of the increasingly 
important multiple alliance phenomena. Much scholarly attention has been diverted towards 
building alliance capabilities to improve alliance management practices, since numerous studies 
have found that strong alliance capabilities improve the otherwise notoriously high alliance 
failure rates and even stock market responses to alliance announcements. However, individual 
alliance management issues have so far dominated the best practices harnessed by such alliance 
capabilities (Alliance Analyst, 1996; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2001). 
Most notably within multiple alliance research, the network literature has shifted the unit of 
analysis from the firm-level to the network-level, and build fundamental knowledge on e.g. 
network structures, network positions, access to network resources, socially embedded ties, 
network densities, and structural holes (e.g. Powell et al, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Burt, 1992; Walker 
et al, 1997; Gnyawali et al, 2001). Recently, managerial implications have been derived for 
decisions on the firm’s membership of a multi-firm network, firm positioning within network 
groups, mapping of competitors’ networks, and network management (Comes-Casseres, 1996; 
de Man, 2002; de Man, Geurts and van Dulleman, 2001; Booz, Allen Hamilton, 2000). 
However, from a firm perspective, the challenges of firms’ increasing number of alliances are 
far from covered by expanding the analysis from two-partner alliances (dyads) to multi-partner 
alliances (networks). Indeed, a firm may participate in numerous multi-partner networks as well 
as numerous dyadic alliances that connect the firm with networks of partners’ partners. 
Moreover, as elegantly noted by Dyer and Singh, “changing one’s mindset from the firm to the 
dyad/network as a key unit of analysis may be uncomfortable because the firm is the ‘unit of 
accrual’ for performance [e.g. profits and share value]” (1999:186). In filling the research gap 
and keeping the ‘unit of accrual’ at the centre of analysis, alliance portfolio management is 
emerging as the firm discipline of building and managing a focal firm’s entire portfolio of two-
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partner and multiple-partner alliances. However, with a few notable exceptions very limited 
managerial guidance is available to inform managerial decisions on e.g. which specific alliances 
to include in the firm’s alliance mix to pursue strategic objectives, how to operationally 
maximize the value creation from a portfolio of often interrelated alliances, and how to on a 
continuous basis reengineer the firm’s alliance web to accommodate the firm’s changing 
strategic intents and changing market and technological environments (Hamel and Doz, 1996 
and 1998; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Duysters, de Man and Wildeman, 1999; Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; Booz Allen Hamilton, 2000). Thus, this paper sets out to improve managerial 
guidance on alliance portfolio management, and thereby expand the managerial principles 
underlying alliance capabilities. A recent McKinsey study (2002) points to the urgency of 
improving alliance portfolio management guidance. Through work with above 500 firms and 
executive interviews, the strategy consultancy found that too often alliance portfolios grow into 
a random mix of ventures assembled over the years by various business units, that overall 
performance measurement of the portfolio is lacking, and that often overall alignment between a 
company’s overall competitive strategy and its alliance activities is missing. 
 
The paper’s aim is to elevate available managerial guidance on alliance portfolio management 
and contribute to the emergent research stream concerned with the opportunities and constraints 
of alliance portfolio management (Stuart, 2000; George et al, 2001; McKinsey, 2002; Deloitte, 
2001; Doz and Hamel, 1996 and 1998). To this end, a managerial framework is proposed that 
introduces risk diversification and portfolio synergies as two valuable managerial levers for 
alliance portfolio management. Thereby, an effort is made to reconcile academic studies of 
alliance networks as potential sources of competitive advantage with the firm perspective (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Molina, 1999; Dyer and Singh, 1999). Given the immense diversity of alliance 
types (Contractor and Lorange, 2002), the paper focus on the management of multiple R&D 
alliances. This because the propensity of firms to form strategic alliances has been found 
particularly high in high-tech and turbulent industries due to increasing technological 
complexity, a brutal pace of technological development, technology convergence between 
previously unrelated fields and an increasing global spread of R&D competencies (e.g 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Teece, 1996). Empirical evidence also suggests that especially large platform 
companies choose to build comprehensive and diverse portfolios of R&D alliances to drive their 
innovative efforts, while specialized technology firms strive to successfully navigate industry 
networks by team-up with a one or few platform firms to commercialize their inventions 
(Cusumano and Gaver, 2002; Duysters et al, 1999). Consequently, this paper studies alliance 
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portfolio management from the corporate perspective of large high-tech platform firms. 
Empirical evidence is obtained from the leading Japanese wireless operator NTT DoCoMo that 
manages a vast and diverse R&D alliance portfolio. In support of the aim to build a managerial 
framework for high-tech platform firms’ alliance portfolio management efforts, Williamson and 
Meegan recently proposed as a route of fruitful future research “the need to model more 
completely the dynamic optimization problem posed by the challenge of forming, structuring 
and evolving a partnership network that facilitates efficient and speedy innovation” (2002:18). 
 
The managerial framework provided in this paper posits that alliance portfolio management be 
guided by two valuable managerial levers. Firstly, alliance managers can optimize the risk-
return properties of the firm’s alliance portfolio by diversifying three R&D alliance-related risk 
classes (i.e. market risks, technology risks, and capability risks). Secondly, the alliance manager 
can maximize the total returns of the firm’s alliance portfolio by reaping portfolio synergy 
effects at four distinctive levels in the portfolio (i.e. between multiple alliances with the same 
partner, between same types of alliances, between different types of alliances, and among all 
alliances in the portfolio). The framework builds on early research on multiple alliance 
management, analogue reasoning from Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and illustrative 
empirical evidence from NTT DoCoMo. Since the early 1950s, MPT has emerged as the core 
theory on multi-asset management of interdependent financial investments (Elton and Gruber, 
1997). Now, this paper holds it worthwhile to explore the theory’s full potential to inform 
alliance portfolio management beyond previous loose attempts by means of rather rigorous 
analogue reasoning (see e.g. Deloitte, 2001). The case company NTT DoCoMo was chosen 
because it has successfully deployed multiple types of R&D alliances as a fundamental element 
of its competitive strategy (Standard & Poors, 2001; Ratliff, 2002, Williamson and Meegan, 
2002; Annual report, 2002). Specifically, the company develops new wireless service 
applications, wireless handsets, wireless infrastructure, technology standards and new business 
concepts in collaboration with partners (Press releases, 1997-2002). Being a large platform firm 
in a high-tech and turbulent industry, NTT DoCoMo provides illustration of the managerial 
framework (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). 
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2. Background literature: From individual alliances to alliance portfolios 
2.1 Gap in the alliance literature and best practice 
In the past two decades, a substantial alliance literature has been stipulated by an unprecedented 
growth of strategic technology alliance formations identified by a plurality of empirical studies 
(Hergert and Morris, 1988; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002). As evident from 
numerous literature reviews (Parkhe, 1993; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997; Inkpen, 2001; Ireland 
et al, 2002), the research stream has focussed on dyadic partnerships in terms of e.g. motivations 
for forming such alliances, building appropriate interorganizational processes for joint value 
creation to meet strategic intents, designing effective governance structures with contractual and 
relational mechanisms, and alliance management of conflicts and evolving partner strategies. 
Academic research has been paralleled by an increasing establishment of dedicated alliance 
functions in firms and emerging best practices for individual alliance management (Alliance 
Analyst, 1996). For instance, Anand and Khanna observe an “increasing formalization of 
processes by which a firm can systematize the acquisition or development of an ‘alliance 
capability’” (2000:298). In the hitherto most detailed study of alliance management practices, 
Kale, Dyer and Singh (2001) found that dedicated alliance functions significantly improve 
alliance success rates and stock market gains after alliance announcements. Such alliance 
functions “provide an important formalization mechanism through which allianzing know-how 
can be articulated, codified, shared and internalized within the organization” (Eisenhard and 
Martin; 2000:1114). Currently, alliance best practices that inform the daily work of dedicated 
functions are primarily concerning individual alliance management issues including partner 
selection, alliance design, -management and -evaluation (Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2001).  
 
As noted previously, empirical research has reported that leading firms engage in an increasing 
number of R&D alliances (Harbison and Pekar, 1998; Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 2000). 
Concurrently, an emergent literature body points to severe challenges of engaging in multiple 
alliances for the firm’s pursuit of competitive advantage (George, Zahra, Wheatley and Khan, 
2001; Stuart, 2000; Duysters, de Man and Wildeman, 1999, Gulati, 1998, Doz and Hamel, 1998; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Such difficult alliance portfolio management decisions include when to 
change the alliance mix by entering, changing and/or terminating alliances. This parallels 
financial investors’ decisions on which company stocks to buy and sell, and whether to raise or 
lower holdings (i.e. investments) in the individual company stocks constituting the portfolio. 
Intuitively, such critical portfolio decisions must build on assessments of e.g. alliance fit and 
value-added to portfolio, alliance redundancy, conflicting alliances, achieved access and 
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accumulation of strategic assets, strength of portfolio compared to competitors, scope for 
improved portfolio performance through active management of e.g. knowledge flows and 
sharing, and the positive and negative effects of partners’ partners to the portfolio’s value 
creation. Currently, however, extant alliance literature falls short of providing sufficient 
guidance on alliance portfolio management. The alliance research has been overly focused on 
bilateral alliance issues and only recently, scholars have encouraged elevation of the literature 
towards perspectives on multiple alliances (Gulati, 1998; Ireland et al, 2002; Williamson and 
Meegan, 2002). Moreover, the majority of multiple alliance research has shifted the unit of 
analysis from the firm to the network level, and thereby studied the dynamics of multi-partner 
networks. In particular, network scholars have refined traditional structural industry analysis 
(e.g. Scherer and Ross, 1990) to span insights on e.g. the impact of firms’ embeddedness in 
networks on the nature of competition and industry profitability (Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 
2000; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Gomes-Casseres, 1996), firms’ innovative activities and 
output (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doer, 1996; Ahuja, 2000), and the patterns of network 
formation (Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997). A range of network properties are central to this 
research in determining a firm’s asymmetric access to valuable network resources and 
information flows. Following the above studies, the most important properties of network 
structure are (1) a firm’s network membership, (2) the centrality of the firm’s network position, 
as it increases network advantages (Gulati, 1998), (3) the event of structural holes in the network 
that creates possibilities for network arbitrage (Burt, 1992), (4) the density of the firm’s network 
increasing asymmetric advantages (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001), (5) tie modalities defined 
by the norms and rules governing network ties, and (6) the incident of both direct and indirect 
ties. The derived implications for firms of this research are largely confined to managerial tools 
such as are network mappings and network structure analysis (Comes-Casseres, 1996; de Man, 
2002; de Man, Geurts and van Dulleman, 2001). With the few notable exceptions deployed in 
this paper’s below framework development, thus, the multiple alliance literature lacks firm 
perspective research to inform the emergent discipline of alliance portfolio management to 
simultaneously manage a focal firm’s multiple, diverse and often interdependent alliance 
portfolio consisting both of single-partner alliances dealt with by traditional dyad alliance and 
multiple-partner alliances studied by the emergent network research (Doz and Hamel, 1996 and 
1998; Booz, Allen Hamilton, 2000, Duysters et al, 1999; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995; 
Deloitte, 2001; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Stuart, 2000; McKinsey, 2002). In sum, there is a 
need to elevate theorizing on the simultaneous management of multiple dyadic and multi-partner 
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alliances and to develop best practices on alliance portfolio management to inform especially 
high-tech platform firm’s dedicated alliance functions. 
 
2.2. Research scope 
As outlined in the introduction, this paper studies alliance portfolio management in the context 
of high-tech and rapidly changing environments. Here, global competitive battles constitute 
Schumpeterian worlds of innovation-based competition and creative destruction of existing 
competences requiring successful firms to adapt to and at best capitalize on the rapidly changing 
environment (Schumpeter, 1934; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece Pisano and Shuen, 1997). 
Consequently, firms face a substantial need to continuously innovate and promptly respond to 
competitors’ innovations in regimes of rapid technological change (Nelson, 1991; Narula and 
Hagedoorn, 1999). Under such conditions of high degrees of strategic and technological 
uncertainties, R&D alliances often outperform go-it-alone and acquisition-based strategies as 
efficient vehicles for performing a range of strategic innovation-related functions (Teece, 1992; 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Doz and Hamel, 1996; Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 1999). The alliance literature on alliance motives has formally studied why firms 
increasingly make make-or-buy choices in favour of R&D alliances in high-tech industries. 
Hagedoorn (1993) identified three key categories of motives in the alliance literature and tested 
them with large sample analysis of nearly 10.000 technology alliances involving around 3500 
different partnering firms. Firstly, the motives that relate to R&D and characteristics of 
technological development are a) the increased complexity and convergence of technology, b) 
reduction, minimization and sharing of uncertainty of R&D, and c) reduction and sharing of 
costs of R&D. Secondly, the motives that relate to innovation processes are d) capturing partner 
tacit knowledge and technologies and that e) shortening PLC necessitates reduction of time-to-
market from invention. Lastly, motives related to market access and search for opportunities are 
f) to monitor environmental changes and opportunities, g) internationalization, and h) new 
product development and expansion of product range (also Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 
1996). For these reasons, R&D alliances are becoming fundamental for innovative activities 
such as rapid, flexible and innovative R&D, product development, technology development, 
process development, and production (Kogut, 1988; Doz and Hamel, 1998; EIU, 1999; Mowery, 
Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Teece and Pisano, 1994). Additionally, R&D alliances are 
increasingly important for the rapid diffusion of technologies to develop and promote industry 
standards (Teece, 1992; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 1999).  
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The paper’s research scope is delineated to high-tech platform firms that orchestrate innovation 
through webs of R&D partnerships (Cusumano and Gaver, 2002). These central firms often 
assume nodal network positions from which they build, manage, and maintain multiple alliance 
classes to fulfil strategic innovation objectives (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995). Indicative 
examples of such firms include Sony, Microsoft, Intel, NTT DoCoMo, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco, 
software integrators tapping into large webs of small software developers, and big Pharma 
pursuing drug discovery and development through multiple alliances with biotech firms. In 
high-technology settings, extant alliance literature suggests that key central firm competencies 
are firstly, sustained leadership in their own strategic technologies and competences (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998), and secondly, core competences in assuming a nodal position such as the creation 
of novel business ideas and visions, strong brands, the ability to foster trust and reciprocity 
among multiple partners, knowledge and capability sharing with partners, moderation of 
network conflicts, prioritization of limited firm resources to multiple demanding partners, and 
partner selection, development and exclusion (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Duysters et 
al, 1999). Hence, the role of the central platform firm is to actively manage the alliance 
portfolio, and this task requires alliance portfolio management capabilities additional to 
individual alliance management capabilities. This paper sets out to contribute to available 
guidance for central firms on the managerial principles that underlie such capabilities. 
 
3. R&D Alliance Portfolio Management  
To advance extant multiple alliance research and managerial guidance for the perspective of a 
high-tech platform firm, the paper posits a managerial framework for alliance portfolio 
management. Below, the managerial framework and its two managerial levers risk 
diversification and portfolio synergies are introduced for overview. Secondly, to initiate the 
framework development, antecedents to portfolio analysis and to MPT are briefly reviewed. 
Thirdly, the framework is developed through analogue reasoning based on MPT with 
translations of its core concepts into the context of R&D alliances, relevant multiple alliance 
research, evidence from NTT DoCoMo and inspiration from the corporate diversification 
literature. Based on the conceptual framework development and following the papers ambition 
to span managerial guidance, the two managerial levers are applied to empirical evidence from 
NTT DoCoMo and the global wireless sector. This operationalization both serves for generally 
illustration and identification of the main managerial steps involved in the framework’s 
application. These managerial implications are summarized after the two in-depth sections on 
risk diversification and portfolio synergies. 
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 Alliance Portfolio 
risk and return optimization
Diversifying 3 portfolio risk classes:
– Technology risks 
– Market risks 
– R&D/capability risks
Reaping portfolio synergies at 4 
portfolio levels: 
– Across alliances with same partner 
– Within a portfolio class 
– Across a subset of portfolio classes 
– Across the entire portfolio 
Objective: 
 
 
 
Managerial 
levers: 
 
 
 
 
 
Portfolio 
analysis and 
selection: 
 
 
Analysis of R&D 
alliances and 
classes: 
 
How optimize risk/return by entering, managing and terminating R&D 
alliances? 
 
The four framework levels are briefly introduced. Following Modern Portfolio Theory, the 
managerial objective pursued by the framework is to optimize the risks and returns of the high-
tech platform firm’s R&D alliance portfolio. For this end, two valuable managerial levers are 
identified. The first lever is risk diversification through R&D alliances of three critical risks 
faced by high-tech platform firms, namely (1) technology risks, (2) market risks, and (3) 
R&D/capability risks. The second lever is portfolio synergies that increases overall portfolio 
returns by exploring synergy potentials at four distinctive levels in the R&D alliance portfolio. 
While the managerial objective and the managerial levers provides the overall purpose and 
structure of the framework, the real thrust and managerial value lies in the guidance delivered to 
alliance portfolio managers on how to achieve risk diversification and portfolio synergies. Based 
on key principles derived from Modern Portfolio Theory and alliance antecedents, thus, a 
portfolio analysis approach to inform portfolio management level decisions. Lastly, implications 
for the retrieval of input to the portfolio analysis from the complementary managerial layer of 
individual alliance management are addressed. 
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3.1 Introduction to Portfolio Analysis and Modern Portfolio Theory 
Since the early 1950s, MPT has informed portfolio management of stock and corporate bond 
investments by optimizing risk-return properties of asset portfolios (Markowitz, 1952; 
Markowitz, 1999). Theory founder and Harry M. Markowitz formulated the portfolio problem 
as a choice of the mean and the variance of a portfolio of assets that exploits the effects of asset 
return correlation to diversify portfolio risks. With the mean variance portfolio theory, he proved 
that an asset portfolio can be optimized by either keeping constant the expected return and 
minimizing risks (i.e. variance), or keeping risk constant and maximizing expected returns 
(Elton and Gruber, 1997). Markowitz’s student and originator of the most widely used empirical 
application of MPT, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), William F. Sharpe (1963, 1970), 
encouraged application of MPT outside the original domain of financial asset management. At a 
higher level of abstraction, he suggests that “portfolio theory is concerned with decisions 
involving outcomes that cannot be predicted with complete certainty … [and that] the theory 
insists that uncertainty be acknowledged and dealt with explicitly. It also insists that 
interrelationships among outcomes be treated explicitly” (Sharpe, 1970:1-2). Therefore, he 
proposed an alternative name for the theory: “The Theory of Making Decisions Involving 
Interrelated Uncertainty Outcomes”. Since R&D alliances are highly signified by ‘interrelated 
uncertainty outcomes’, analogue reasoning from MPT for R&D alliance portfolio management 
is argued to be a promising starting point to elevate academic research and managerial guidance. 
 
When searching for antecedents for such an endeavour, one finds that portfolio analysis and the 
intuitively powerful construct of risk diversification are widespread concepts. In the Merchant of 
Venice written at the end of the 16th century, Shakespeare has the merchant Antonio say: “My 
ventures are not in one bottom trusted. Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate. Upon the 
fortune of this present year; Therefore, my merchandise makes me not sad “ (Act 1, Scene 1 as 
quoted by Markowitz,1999). More recently, portfolio analysis tools have gained ground in 
several management fields including the management of product portfolios, technology 
portfolios, R&D project portfolios, and portfolios of strategic options, as well as in the corporate 
diversification literature (e.g. Henderson, 1970; Day, 1977; Williamson, 1999; Cooper, Edgett 
and Kleinsmidt, 2001; Roussel et al, 1991; Chien, 2002; MacMillian and McGrath, 2002; 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). Moreover, a few endeavours have been made into alliance 
portfolio analysis from the firm perspective of one company (i.e. not the network perspective of 
many companies). George et. al (2001) identify distinctive alliance portfolio characteristics that 
significantly contribute to a company’s financial performance, but their results are conferred to 
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individual alliance descriptors such as individual alliances’ vertical and horizontal structure 
rather than portfolio level descriptors. Stuart (2000) argues that benefits gained from a portfolio 
of strategic alliances are determined in part by partner characteristics and technological 
competencies of the firms in the portfolio. Moreover, leading management consultancies are 
developing alliance portfolio management services, but unsurprisingly available reports rather 
points to challenges and problems than managerial solutions (e.g. Deloitte, 2001; Booz Allen 
Hamilton, 2000; McKinsey, 2002). Among these antecedents, a few make sporadic references to 
MPT, but most study portfolios and diversification without drawing explicitly on MPT. Thus, 
while portfolio analysis is not unique to MPT, the theory provides the best elaborated, refined 
and operationalized mechanism to optimize asset portfolios. Specifically, it builds on the core 
concepts of asset return correlation and portfolio level returns and risks, as well as an analytical 
approach breaking down portfolio analysis with the objective to maximize portfolio returns and 
minimize portfolio risks. This paper explores these core constructs as encouraged by Sharpe 
(1970) to explore the theory’s full potential to inform R&D alliance portfolio management. 
 
3.2 Analogue reasoning 
The use of analogue reasoning demands careful consideration of how core MPT concepts 
meaningfully translate into the context of R&D alliance portfolios. In their application of 
biology as an analogy for their evolutionary theory, Nelson and Winter (1982) note as a crucial 
yardstick that while parts of the analogue theory are used, other elements are completely 
excluded from their analysis when the elements do not make sense in the new context. Gould 
encourages similar caution by warning against “the fallacy of unwarranted analogy” (1987, as 
cited by Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1989).  
 
The endeavour to draw implications from MPT for alliance portfolio management finds support 
in the similar fundamental characteristics shared by financial portfolios and R&D alliance 
portfolios. In both cases, the objective of multiple asset management is maximization of one 
entity’s portfolio outcomes. Sharpe defines a portfolio as “the totality of decisions determining 
an individual’s future prospects [in terms of consumption] is called a portfolio” (1970:19). 
Similarly, the alliance literature defines R&D alliance portfolios as multiple R&D alliances that 
are managed by one central firm (i.e. the investor) (Hamel and Doz, 1996; 1998; Booz Allen 
Hamilton, 2000). Specifically, the financial investor seeks wealth maximization in terms of the 
realized rate of return from share and bond investments (Sharpe, 1970). Likewise, the central 
firm maximizes the total cost-benefit performance (i.e. return) of its R&D alliance portfolio, 
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rather than individual alliance performance (Duysters et al, 1999). Another shared fundamental 
characteristic is that the outcomes of financial investments and R&D alliances are both uncertain 
and often interdependent. Thus, the tasks of stock portfolio managers and R&D alliance 
portfolio managers are fundamentally comparable. 
 
Conversely, however, on some key dimensions R&D alliances fundamentally differ from shares 
and bonds as an asset type. Firstly, a financial investor rarely is in the position to impact the 
performance of individual bonds and shares, but optimizes portfolio performance exclusively by 
combining financial assets (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). In contrast to such passive 
management of individual assets, active alliance management fuelled by the central firm’s 
alliance capabilities has been found to significantly impact the performance of individual R&D 
alliances (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2001; Anand and Khanna, 2000). Secondly, whereas monetary 
returns from financial investments are easily absorbed, the appropriation of R&D alliance 
returns such as partner or jointly developed resources is inherently more difficult (Hamel, 1991; 
Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Following extant multiple alliance literature, these differences are 
resolved by positioning the alliance portfolio management framework as a complementary 
managerial layer to individual alliance management that simultaneously works to optimize 
individual alliance performance and value extraction (Duysters et al, 1999; Hamel and Doz, 
1996). Indeed, a portfolio of failing R&D alliances is unlikely to generate value no matter the 
portfolio management efforts. 
 
3.3 Framework development 
Through analogue reasoning, this paper uses especially two MPT elements to develop a 
framework for R&D alliance portfolio management. Firstly, Sharpe’s (1970:31-32) three-step 
analytical approach to portfolio management provides structure for the framework development. 
Secondly, MPT’s underlying logic of interaction between individual assets’ return correlation 
and portfolio level return and risks provides the specific mechanisms through which R&D 
alliance portfolios are optimized. Below, thus, MPT’s core constructs and their implications for 
R&D alliance portfolios are discussed following Sharpe’s three-step approach; (1) Asset 
analysis, (2) portfolio analysis and (3) portfolio selection.  
 
3.3.1 Asset analysis 
Portfolio management builds on knowledge about the portfolio’s individual assets, and MPT 
involve estimation of three key dimensions: (1) the expected rate of return, (2) the uncertainty 
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associated with the expected rate of return, and (3) the correlation of the asset’s expected return 
with the other assets in the portfolio.  
The expected rate of return 
The expected rate of return express the proportion of expected cash inflows and outflows (e.g. 
(share dividends + share gains)/(share price)). Similar definitions of R&D alliance returns are 
emerging in the slipstream of the alliance motives literature (Hagedoorn, 1993). Inherently, 
however, R&D alliance returns are more difficult to measure, monitor and evaluate (Park and 
Ungson, 2001). For instance, a recent study found that only 11% of alliances have sufficient 
performance metrics (Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2001). In response, valuation tools deploying a 
cost-benefit conceptualization of alliance returns have been proposed such as moneterized NPV 
frameworks (McKinsey, 2002) and more qualitative strategic planning tools weighing key 
alliance costs and benefits given the firm’s strategic objectives for the R&D alliance (Contractor 
and Lorange, 1988a, 1988b; Inkpen, 1996; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Keil, 2000). As alliance 
managers develop an understanding of R&D alliance economics, they will be able to estimate 
expected rates of returns either in straightforward financial terms, and/or in the qualitative terms 
by understanding the expected comparable cost-benefits of executing a R&D project through an 
R&D alliance as opposed to internal R&D or acquisitions. Such analysis will provide the 
necessary knowledge of a R&D alliance’s expected rate of return for alliance portfolio 
management. 
 
Uncertainty 
The second key dimension of asset analysis is uncertainty. Broadly speaking asset risks can be 
thought of in numerous ways, but MPT provides a clear and useful core conceptualization of 
uncertainty. Asset risks are defined as the likelihood that expected and actual rates of return will 
diverge, and the potential discrepancy is caused by uncertain future events that influence the 
return rate’s cost and benefit components. For instance, the financial investor is concerned with 
the uncertain future events that potentially but not predictably may alter the share price and 
dividend payments that determine his rate of return (Sharpe, 1970). For financial assets, the 
variability of the rate of return (i.e. standard deviation) is widely accepted as a useful risk 
measure (Brealey, Myers and Marcus, 1995; Elton and Gruber, 1997). Again, for financial 
assets, MPT and its empirical analogue, the CAPM, divide the issuing firm’s risk into non-
systematic and systematic risks each of which is caused by fundamentally different types of 
uncertain future events. Systematic risks stem from uncertain future macroeconomic events such 
“changes in monetary and fiscal policies, the cost of energy, tax laws, and the demographics of 
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the marketplace” that affect all firms and thereby all stocks and bonds in the same market 
(Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994:110). Non-systematic risks stem from uncertain future firm-
specific events such as “the loss of a major customer […], the death of a high-ranking executive, 
a fire at a plant, and the sudden obsolescence of a key product technology” (Lubatkin and 
Chatterjee, 1994:110). MPT informs investors to diversify non-systematic risks through efficient 
portfolio selection, whereas it argues that systematic market risks cannot be reduced. 
 
For R&D alliance portfolio management, this paper identifies three key non-systematic risk 
classes that R&D alliance managers can successfully diversify. These are (1) market risks (i.e. 
likelihood of the event that customers will not buy the new products or technologies developed 
in the R&D alliance), (2) technology risks (i.e. likelihood of the event that the R&D alliance’s 
pursued technological trajectory will not prevail), and (3) capability risks (i.e. likelihood of the 
event that the R&D alliance partners cannot achieve the joint goals together). To clarify, it may 
be intuitively confusing for the attentive reader that market and technology risks are argued to 
by non-systematic, since the CAPM identifies general macroeconomic movements as systematic 
(i.e. non-diversifiable) risks. This difference arises from the shift in unit of analysis from the 
original firm-level for financial assets to the sub-firm- level of R&D alliances. At this level 
market and technological developments may affect individual R&D alliances’ risks differently. 
This parallels corporate diversification research’s MPT-based reasoning on unrelated 
diversification holding that business-unit (i.e. sub-firm-level) specific risks are diversifiable by 
bringing together unrelated business units offering different products and/or serving different 
markets (i.e. “putting all one’s eggs in different baskets”) (Rumelt, 1974; Amit and Livnat, 
1988; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). The three risk classes are derived from the alliance 
evolution literature’ treatment of alliance change forces. The competitive and technological 
environments have been identified as the two key external change forces that are uncertain but 
nevertheless latently threatens to disrupt the initial (i.e. expected) alliance strategy, 
organizational design, as well as the terms of cost and benefit sharing. Likewise, the literature 
identifies internal changes forces stemming from e.g. changing partner strategic objectives, 
differential learning, conflicts, and the uncertainty inherent in R&D. For simplicity, these are 
combined into one risk class, namely capability risks (Harrigan, 1985; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997; Doz, 1996; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Later, each risk class is elaborated 
further through explanation of their theoretical underpinnings. 
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Correlation: risk diversification 
The third key dimension of asset analysis is correlation, which measures the extent to which the 
outcomes of two assets move together and has two dimensions: degree and direction. The 
degree of outcome correlation can in the extreme cases be either perfectly correlated or 
uncorrelated, and otherwise lie in-between. The direction of outcome correlation can be either 
positive or negative. Correlation between two assets is not necessarily rooted in a causal 
relationship, but only the extent to which two assets are likely to have same outcomes (Sharpe, 
1970). Asset outcome correlation informs portfolio analysis to achieve risk diversification and 
thereby reduce portfolio return variability (i.e. uncertainty). Diversification reduces portfolio 
risks, when the uncertain future events that influence asset returns are neither uncorrelated nor 
perfectly correlated, but correlated to a degree and at best negatively correlated (Sharpe, 1970; 
Brealey, Myers and Marcus, 1995). Risk diversification is also found in the emerging research 
on interdependencies among R&D alliances outcomes. In line with MPT’s risk diversification 
logic, thus, the “reduction, minimizing and sharing of uncertainty in R&D” has been identified 
as a leading motive for high-tech firms to engage in R&D alliances (Hagedoorn, 1993:373; 
Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). However, extant literature’s advice to R&D alliance 
managers that want to explore the promises of risk diversification fails to expand beyond that 
more alliances are better than few. Departing from this initial evidence that R&D alliance 
correlation as discussed in the alliance literature is broadly consistent with MPT’s logic of risk 
diversification, this paper will later enhance managerial advice on how to exploit risk 
diversification by identifying the specific conditions (i.e. uncertain future events) under which 
R&D alliances’ market risks, technology risks and capability risks can be diversified. 
 
Correlation: portfolio synergies 
Risk diversification alone does however not cover the full potential for exploration of R&D 
alliance outcome correlation to improve R&D alliance portfolio returns and risks. A literature 
review reveals that most alliance research on the discreteness or interdependence (i.e. 
correlation) of multiple alliances concerns the positive correlation of synergetic R&D alliance 
returns, which is a distinctively different kind of correlation than the one exploited with risk 
diversification. At the low end of this correlation scale, no correlation may exist across the 
platform firm’s alliance portfolio, when being “but the sum of individual discrete alliances with 
little co-ordination and cumulativeness between alliances” (Hamel and Doz; 1996:9). In such 
cases, portfolio synergies are unlikely to increase the portfolio returns above the weighted sum 
of individual R&D alliance returns as defined by MPT. Scale upwards, however, researchers 
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have explored numerous types of interdependence among alliances. Examples include the 
degree of which the central firms’ partners interact with each other and not merely the central 
firm itself, the degree to which the achievement of individual alliance objectives are dependent 
on other alliances, the degree of applicability of the central firm’s technologies and capabilities 
to several alliances, and the degree of coordination between alliances (Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton, 2000; Doz and Hamel, 1996 and 1998). In agreement with MPT, hence, research on 
portfolio synergies stresses the importance of studying interdependence degrees for alliance 
portfolio management (Hamel and Doz, 1996). 
 
Based on interdependence discussions, scholars distinguish between portfolio synergies that 
either accrue internally in the central firm, or externally across R&D alliances. Internal portfolio 
synergies can e.g. be spanned from (1) applying the central firm’s resources and capabilities in a 
complementary manner to partners’ e.g. different product and geographical markets (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998), (2) improved bargaining position vis-à-vis new portfolio members accumulated 
from collaboration with existing members, (3) improved industry structure or e.g. technology 
standards development from the perspective of the focal firms core competences, (4) 
development of multiple options on technology development at an affordable cost (Hamel and 
Doz, 1996). Thereby, an alliance portfolio enables the central firm to fill multiple and diverse 
resource and capability gaps, and hence rely on the alliance portfolio for a substantial fraction of 
the total resource and capability base underlying its competitive offerings (Booz, Allen, 
Hamilton, 2000). External portfolio synergies (i.e. those accrued across partnering firms) have 
been found in interfirm networks that leverage, share and diffuse knowledge not only between 
the central firm and its individual partners as in discrete alliances, but also across partners 
improving the quality of a class of interdependent alliances as excelled e.g. by Toyota (Duysters 
et al, 1999; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). Thereby, the central firm creates value by acting as a 
broker between the members of the portfolio (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
 
Following the above, portfolio synergies stand out as a second interesting portfolio effect that 
together with MPT’s risk diversification effect hold great potential in enhancing R&D alliance 
portfolio management. In essence, the reviewed literature suggests that synergetic correlation 
increases aggregated alliance portfolio returns by lowering costs (e.g. through leverage of 
knowledge required to perform alliance activities) and/or increasing benefits (e.g. 
complementarities across newly developed products and technologies). Thereby, R&D alliance 
portfolio synergies build on a different logic than risk diversification, as the objective is to 
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increase the portfolio level return rather than to reduce portfolio level risks. In terms of the MPT 
core construct correlation, portfolio synergies accrue when R&D alliance returns are positively 
correlated and at best to high degrees. Whereas the discussion of MPT’s risk diversification lead 
to associations with the corporate diversification literature’s treatment of unrelated 
diversification, R&D alliance portfolio synergies parallel the corporate diversification 
literature’s treatment of related diversification that favours bringing together synergistically 
interrelated business units (i.e. putting all of one’s eggs in similar baskets) (Bettis and Hall, 
1982; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). In related diversification, valuable business synergies are 
especially reaped from (1) scale economies from combined performance of value chain 
activities, (2) supply-side economies of scope through transferring existing strategic assets and 
competencies in building new strategic assets between related business units, (3) demand-side 
economies of scope through enhanced product line differentiation, and (4) improved market 
power through multipoint form of competition (i.e. conglomerate power) (Amit and Livnat, 
1988; Montgomery, 1994; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994; Markides and Williamson, 1996). 
The evident overlaps between portfolio synergies and related diversification lend further support 
and inspiration to this second managerial lever of the alliance portfolio management framework. 
 
The alliance antecedents and the corporate diversification literature indicate that portfolio 
synergies are quite diverse. To systematize portfolio synergies, the alliance portfolio 
management framework posits four distinctive portfolio levels to guide the search for R&D 
alliance portfolio synergies. The first portfolio level is synergies between alliances with the 
same partnering company. The individual alliance literature has provided ample evidence of 
such partner-specific synergies. The second level is synergies reaped among R&D alliances with 
similar strategic objectives and hence activities (e.g. R&D in the same technology or product 
field). The subdivision of the alliance portfolio into groups of different alliances types stems 
from the multiple alliance antecedents, and arguably improve managerial overview by reducing 
the analytical complexity of multiple alliance management (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 2000; 
Duysters et al, 1999). The third level of portfolio synergies suggested by the framework 
concerns portfolio synergies reaped across a subset of alliance types, which were inspired by 
evidence from NTT DoCoMo. Lastly, the fourth level considers portfolio synergies reaped 
across the entire portfolio that are not specific to neither individual partners, particular types of 
R&D alliances or combinations thereof. Rather these portfolio synergies improve the aggregate 
R&D alliance portfolio return by positively influencing all R&D alliances in the portfolio. 
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In sum, based on discussions of R&D alliance return and return correlation, two managerial 
levers for alliance portfolio management are proposed, namely risk diversification and portfolio 
synergies. Whereas the above asset analysis concerned how to analyze individual alliances in 
terms of return, risk and correlation, the below portfolio analysis is concerned with the 
aggregate analysis of multiple R&D alliances to unleash the value of risk diversification and 
portfolio synergies for alliance portfolio management. 
 
3.3.2 Portfolio analysis 
The second step in Sharpe’s three-step approach to portfolio management is portfolio analysis, 
which produces predictions about alternative portfolios’ expected portfolio return and risks. 
Portfolio analysis is based entirely on the individual asset analysis’ estimates of the expected 
rates of return, the associated uncertainty and the correlation of individual asset outcomes. The 
aim is to identify efficient portfolios (i.e. specific combinations of potential investments in 
various assets) at the so-called efficient frontier, which are the portfolios that offer the highest 
return at a given risk or alternatively the lowest risk at a given return (Sharpe, 1970). The two 
measures used for portfolio performance measurement are the portfolio’s expected rate of return 
and the associated risk expressed in terms of its standard deviation. In numeric terms, a 
portfolio’s expected return is the weighted average of the assets’ expected returns weighted 
according to the proportions of invested capital. The standard deviation of a portfolio’s rate of 
return is a function of the standard deviation of return for its component assets, their correlation 
coefficients and the proportions invested (Sharpe, 1970). Thus, the interrelationships of 
individual asset outcomes influence a portfolio’s associated risk, which as explained earlier is 
exploited through risk diversification. Consequently, a portfolio’s assets cannot be selected on 
characteristics unique to the asset only, because the interaction between assets returns must also 
be considered (Elton and Gruber, 1997). 
 
This paper posits risk diversification and portfolio synergies as the portfolio optimization 
principles (i.e. managerial levers) for R&D alliance portfolio management. The risk 
diversification lever constitutes a direct analogy to MPT, whereas the portfolio synergy lever 
constitutes an indirect analogy to MPT. This because (1) MPT is only concerned with risk 
diversification and (2) for portfolio synergies, only the core principle of portfolio return 
optimization based on individual asset return correlation is derived from MPT. Having 
established the two controlling managerial levers, the next issue is how to analyze information 
gathered about the individual R&D alliances’ return, return uncertainty and return correlation to 
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construct efficient frontier portfolios. MPT has formulated the portfolio analysis for financial 
assets as a mathematical optimization problem (Sharpe, 1970). However, the paper chooses to 
develop the R&D alliance portfolio management framework as a strategic planning tool 
intended to focus managerial attention on key portfolio issues and guide decisions (see 
Contractor and Lorange (1988a, 1988b) for similar argumentation for alliance cost-benefit 
analysis). Hence, in the below framework illustration the portfolio analysis is conducted 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively. 
 
3.3.3 Portfolio selection 
In the final step of Sharpe’s three-step approach is portfolio selection. A specific efficient 
portfolio is chosen and materializes, when the financial investor carries out the implied 
investments, or when the R&D alliance portfolio manager forms new, terminates existing and/or 
changes existing R&D alliances according to the portfolio analysis’ recommendations. MPT 
requires the investor to decide on risk-return preferences, which are then matched with a 
financial asset portfolio at the efficient border (i.e. maximum return at given risk, or minimum 
risk at given return) (Sharpe, 1970). When translated into the context of R&D alliance portfolio 
management, portfolio selection involves careful consideration and cost-benefit analysis of the 
alternative portfolio scenarios based on the firms competitive strategy, technology strategy, 
financial resources and identified needs for product, process and technology development. 
Based on the below detailed illustration of the alliance portfolio management framework, 
managerial implications for portfolio analysis and portfolio selection are presented in the papers 
concluding part. 
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Summary table of extension of MPT for alliance portfolio management 
Step Financial asset portfolio 
management 
R&D alliance portfolio management 
1. Asset Analysis   
Return Expected rate of return Expected cost-benefits of R&D alliance to 
individual partners from pursuing joint 
objectives. 
Risk Expected outcome uncertainty 
(std. deviation). 
R&D alliance outcome uncertainty caused 
by market, technology and capability risks 
Interrelationships Correlation coefficient  R&D alliance outcome interdependency 
leveraged through diversification of 
outcome risks and realization of outcome 
synergies. 
Weight in portfolio Investment Resource commitments (input), strategic 
value (output) 
2. Portfolio Analysis   
Portfolio return Expected portfolio rate of return 
 
Expected cost-benefits of R&D alliance 
portfolio improved above average returns 
of individual alliances through portfolio 
synergies. 
Portfolio risk Expected portfolio outcome 
uncertainty 
R&D alliance portfolio outcome 
uncertainty reduced through risk 
diversification 
3. Portfolio Selection   
Risk-return properties Efficient frontiers of alternative 
constellations of portfolio return 
and portfolio risk 
Cost-benefit properties of an R&D alliance 
portfolio for development of specified 
technology, product and process assets. 
Risk-return 
preferences 
Preferred preferences of 
portfolio return and portfolio risk 
Technology strategy of platform firm in 
terms of innovation targets, allocated 
resources and risk willingness. 
 
3.4 Risk diversification 
This section elaborates and operationalizes the framework’s three diversifiable R&D alliance 
risk classes, namely (1) market risks, (2) technology risks, and (3) capability risks. Firstly, 
theoretical backgrounds on each of the three risk classes provide an intimate understanding of 
the uncertain future events that cause the R&D alliance return uncertainties. Secondly, each of 
the three risk classes are operationalized through illustrative evidence from NTT DoCoMo and 
the wireless telecommunications sector at large. The correlation premise for risk diversification 
(i.e. R&D alliance returns should be neither uncorrelated nor perfectly correlated, but correlated 
to a degree and at best negatively correlated) controls the operationalization. 
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3.4.1 Market risks 
In highly turbulent environments, market risks such as customer adaptation and willingness to 
pay for new products are often substantial. In the tail of technological progress, indeed, 
uncertainties prevail on how to exploit the technological potential commercially. For such 
environments, Porter (1980) stress (1) technological uncertainties on what product configuration 
customers will ultimately demand and (2) strategic uncertainties on which firm strategies as to 
product and market positioning will be superior. Often, buyers of newly developed products are 
first time buyers, which further adds to the risks. These uncertainties are reflected in frequently 
used product frameworks such as the S-curve for product life cycles and the Boston Matrix 
product portfolio tool. Market risks relate to the early introduction and expansion stage of the 
PLC curve, and the Boston matrix’s ‘question marks’ defined by low market share and high 
growth products (Bass, 1969; Boston Consulting Group, 1970). Against this background, market 
risks are defined as the uncertainty of product configuration and commercial uptake. 
 
New wireless service development 
In wireless telecommunications, market risks for new data services are both substantial and 
dominating future growth sources, as traditional voice growth and revenues are maturing. High 
uncertainty prevails as to which future killer applications will drive revenue generation, which 
content types will attract customers, and customers’ willingness to pay (Financial Times, 
November 2002; Communications International, February 2002; Credit Swiss First Boston 
fatphone series; Standard & Poors, 2002). NTT DoCoMo CEO Tachikawa recently pinpointed 
that experience from the infamous I-mode wireless Internet service launched in 1999 on the 
surprising success of entertainment content (and one may add the success of SMS in Europe) 
renders up-front predictions of future killer applications illusive (Economist, 18.07.2002). In 
response, NTT DoCoMo emphasizes resources and time for experimentation “because our 
customers will decide [the commercial success of new applications]” and hence, 
“experimentation is key” (Boston Consulting Group, 2002). Such exploration based strategy 
finds strong support in the learning and innovation literature in dealing with fluctuating and 
uncertain demand (March, 1991; Anderson and Tushman, 2001). 
 
NTT DoCoMo’s experimentation strategy is enacted through rapid and continuous service 
launches based on internal as well as collaborative R&D activities. Specifically, the R&D 
projects explore new business concepts and enabling application platform technologies for new 
service platforms (e.g. Internet, multimedia, car services, location-based services) and new 
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enhancing service platform features (e.g. JAVA and Flash) (Natsuno, 2003). The R&D also 
involves the integration of new application platforms into the hardware and software of the 
wireless telecommunication subsystems including content server systems, wireless transmission 
infrastructure and handsets. Evidently, NTT DoCoMo pursues a substantial proportion of new 
service application through R&D alliances to leverage partnering firms’ complementary 
technologies and converging industry expertise in developing services unreachable for internal 
R&D (see below table). Thereby, it is argued that NTT DoCoMo diversifies uncertain outcomes 
of wireless application R&D in terms of product configuration parameters such as viable 
business models and product concept, as well the applications’ commercial success (i.e. the two 
elements of market risks). 
 
Service type Development partners Alliance objectives 
Graphic rich content 
applications 
1. Sun Microsystems (03/1999) 
2. Macromedia Inc (02/2003) 
Deploy Internet technologies to 
wireless 
Video distribution 
technology via 3G and 
4G 
1. IBM (12/2000) 
2. Hewlett-Packard (12/2000) 
3. Packet-Video (01/2001)  
Video technology R&D, test and 
diffusion 
Video applications 1. FOMA Live-Video Consortium with 32 
partners (09/2001) 
Develop and study video applications
Gateway portal for both 
fixline and wireless 
Internet 
1. JV with AOL and Mitsui (09/2000) R&D and venture investments in PC-
Mobile convergence services  
Gaming 1. Sony (08/2000) 
2. Sega (02/2001) 
R&D in services combining i-mode 
and FOMA with gaming. 
Corporate solutions 80. Corporate solution partners (2001) 
81. SAP (04/2001) 
82. IBM Lotus (11/2001) 
83. Oracle (03/2002) 
Develop and market wireless 
business applications 
Physical service points 1. I-vending with Coca-Cola (09/2000) 
2. I-convenience store JV with Lawson, 
Matsushita and Misubishi (10/2000) 
Develop and market services with 
physical service points 
Wireless advertising 1. JV with Dentsu (06/2000) Develop and market wireless 
advertising 
Car services 1. JV with Mitsui and NEC (07/2000) 
2. Nissan (02/2002) 
3. Lucky Strike Honda F1 (07/2002) 
4. Multi-partner Business Telematics 
Committee with Nissan (12/2002) 
Develop and market telematics 
services 
E-Payment services 1. Payment First (06/2000) 
2. JV Japan Net Bank with Sakura Bank, 
Sumitomo Bank, Fujitsu, KDDI 
(10/2000) 
Develop and market e-payment and 
e-banking wireless services 
Network identify 1. Liberty Alliance Project with 17 
partners (12/2001) 
Create open network identify for 
Internet 
Sources: Company press releases (1997-2003), Natsuno (2003), UBS Warburg (2001), Williamson and 
Meegan (2002). 
 
The evidence from DoCoMo fuels illustration of the potential for risk diversification for 
managing its multiple application alliances. The following discussion departures from the 
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aforementioned correlation premise for R&D alliance returns that is discussed conceptually for 
the two elements of market risks, namely product configuration and commercial uptake. The 
R&D alliance returns related to market risks include expansion of existing product ranges 
through R&D and commercialization, monitoring and pursuing new business opportunities, and 
development of convergence products that especially challenge product configuration, as often 
no existing product market exists (Hagedoorn, 1993). NTT DoCoMo engages in R&D alliance 
working in 11 wireless service fields as demonstrated by the table’s first column grouping of the 
application alliance class. The return of R&D alliances engaged with different service types is 
not perfectly correlated because applications such as video distribution, gaming, corporate 
solutions and car services may target different consumer segments with varying preferences and 
purchasing power. This implies differences in the potential for commercial uptake of wireless 
applications. Conversely, network externalities such as critical mass in overall customer base 
driven by all services for wireless advertisements and relevance of multiple services to 
individual users may have a positive effect on the uptake of otherwise different wireless services 
(Natsuno, 2003; Ratliff, 2002). Provided budget constraints, different service types targeted to 
similar customer groups such as multimedia services and gaming for young segments may even 
be negatively correlated. 
 
The number of R&D alliances within each service type category listed in the tables second 
column is another source of correlation within the application alliance class. Each R&D alliance 
may represent alternative configurations of similar applications and in the case of e.g. gaming 
and corporate solutions NTT DoCoMo collaborates with direct competitors. Hence, alliance 
outcomes are not perfectly uncorrelated as similar services compete for the same budgets and, 
thus, R&D alliance outcomes may even display negative correlation. To the degree that services 
within the same category are complementary and a certain breath of services thus attracts 
customers such as the graphic rich content applications, the alliance outcomes may be positively 
correlated. In sum, the correlation premise finds preliminary support for wireless application 
development as alliance R&D returns arguably are neither perfectly correlated nor uncorrelated, 
but correlated to a degree and at times negatively. 
 
Wireless corporate solutions is explored in more detail to further illustrate risk diversification of 
market risks routed in uncertainty on whether customers will ultimately like and pay for new 
wireless services. Wireless corporate solutions count to the most promising applications of 
wireless technologies and NTT DoCoMo assumes market leadership in this segment with 10% 
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corporate part of the total customer base (Economist, 2001; UBS Warburg, 2001). The wireless 
industry projects great expectations on the corporate segment due to its high data-transfer 
requirements and large communication budgets. To pursue this market, NTT DoCoMo formed 
above 80 R&D alliances with software developers and big client enterprises leading to 
commercialization of numerous services including management systems connected to corporate 
networks for sales representative support, customer information, product information, business 
reporting, and university campus message boards. By 2001, the above 100 services are offered 
under the DoCoMo Value and Link to DoCoMo brands (UBS Warburg, 2001). Through this 
alliance web, market risks for corporate solutions were diversified across a large number of 
R&D alliances. Specifically, the uncertainty of which specific software types, configurations 
and bundles would attract corporate users and induce a sufficient willingness to pay was spread 
out and shared with the many partners. Given the increased global penetration of standardized 
ERP software, in April 2001 NTT DoCoMo teamed up with German software leader SAP to 
develop systems and services, as well as explore possibilities to jointly market such services in 
the firms existing markets. By November 2001, a similar alliance was forged with IBM’s Lotus 
Software unit to jointly develop and globally market wireless multimedia business solutions. 
Following announcements in February 2002 that NTT DoCoMo was seeking additional system 
integrator partners to “help harness the full capabilities of its high-speed 3G services” (Reuters, 
08.02.2002), a R&D alliance with the worlds biggest enterprise software maker Oracle. In total, 
three R&D alliances have been formed with global software leaders that integrates global 
accounting, database management, marketing and production operations for companies 
(Company press releases). Thereby, NTT DoCoMo has diversified market risks of the three 
global enterprise software competitors’ different software offerings in the wireless context. 
 
3.4.2 Technology risks 
In high-tech regimes of rapid technological change, technology standard races among competing 
technology trajectories imply technology risks at the firm level of betting on ultimately obsolete 
technology versions (Anderson and Tushman, 2001). Following evolutionary theory, 
technological risks are critical due to path dependencies shaping firms competence bases, time 
compression diseconomies and the cumulative nature of asset accumulation activities such as 
R&D, and implied irreversibilities thwarting firms from shift trajectory (Dierikx and Cool, 
1989; Teece, 1996).  
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In establishing the context for this risk class, traditional models of technological development 
suggest that “technological progress constitutes an evolutionary system punctuated by 
discontinuous change […] representing technical advance so significant that no increase in 
scale, efficiency, or design can make older technologies competitive with new technology” 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1986:440-441). Dosi (1982) provides an alternative discontinuous 
equilibrium model defining discontinuous technological change as the emergence of new 
technological paradigms defined as “a ‘model’ and a ‘pattern’ of solution of selected 
technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on 
selected material technologies” (emphasis in original Dosi, 1982:152). Technological progress 
‘actualizes the promise’ of a new technological paradigm and is reflected in the emergence of 
multiple technological trajectories defined as a “pattern of ‘normal’ problem solving activity 
(i.e. of ‘progress’) on the ground of a technological paradigm” (Dosi, 1982:152). 
 
Discontinuous change initiates an era of ferment during which the new technology competes 
against both old technologies and multiple emerging versions of the new technology. In the 
emerging selection environment, the latter design competition rests upon uncertainty about 
superiority of alternative versions and the incentives of pioneering firms to differentiate its 
variant from their rivals. The variation in versions of the technological discontinuity in the era of 
ferment that drives the substitution and design competition implies high uncertainties for both 
manufactures, suppliers, customers and regulatory agencies. For instance, competing firms face 
uncertainty about the design, production and commercialization of their respective versions and 
customers face uncertainty about the product performance and the risk of switching costs in case 
another design later emerges as the industry standard. These uncertainties fuel the emergence of 
a dominant design ending the era of ferment, which is a single architecture that establishes 
dominance in a product class or process type (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). In sum, 
positioning in relevant technological trajectories becomes critical for platform firms to reduce 
their exposure to technology obsolescence risks.  
 
Wireless transmission standards 
Technological progress of the core wireless telecommunications technologies responsible for the 
transmission of wireless signals has received substantial scholarly attention that posits that the 
technological progress largely follows the above models of innovation (Funk and Methe, 2001; 
Davies and Brady, 1998; Bekkers, Duysters and Verspagen, 2002). Specifically, technological 
progress has evolved in technology generations (see technology migration map in appendix). 
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First generation analogue transmission technologies with bulky receivers emerged for early 
marine and car telephony such as the US AMPS standard, the Scandinavian NMT standard, and 
TACS. From the early 1990s, second generation technologies such as US IS-95, European 
GSM, and Japanese PDC introduced digital telephony. Digital technology both provided radical 
performance improvements and build on new problem-solving approaches – a discontinuous 
change that initiated the IT convergence through microelectronics of telecommunications 
(Teece, 1996). In recent years, a plurality of so-called 2,5G generation technologies such as 
GPRS, EDGE and CDMA20001X enabling packet-switched and higher-speed data transfers 
than 2G technologies have blurred the borderline between 2nd and 3rd generation technologies. 
Whereas, 2,5G technologies provide performance improvements e.g. from 9,6 kbps to above 
100 kbps transfer speeds, they are largely incremental improvements of key 2G standards such 
as CDMA, TDMA and GSM. Essentially, the two key 3G technologies, CDMA2000 and 
WCDMA are also incremental improvements of the original 2G CDMA technology invented by 
US Qualcomm, and future 4G networks will continue to build on existing 2G and 3G networks 
(Nakajuma and Yamao, 2001).  
 
In developing the technology risk class, it is essential that the premise of risk diversification 
apply well when a focal company seeks access to the competing technology standards. In this 
case, negative correlation of alliance returns driven by causality is apparent, when one standard 
emerges as the dominant design and renders other standards obsolete to some extent. Moreover, 
degrees of positive correlation exist among related competing technological trajectories of a 
technology generation (i.e. paradigm). The managerial implication for risk diversification is to 
build an alliance portfolio with alliances representing competing technology trajectories and 
standard versions within each trajectory to diversify the risk of only having accumulated and/or 
secured access to technology standards that render obsolete.  
 
NTT DoCoMo: a wireless transmission standard leader 
NTT DoCoMo, however, provides only indirect illustration of technology risk diversification. 
NTT DoCoMo experienced how the internally developed 2G PDC technology that lost to the 
European GSM standard that emerged as the dominant global 2G standard due to open standard 
setting through the ETSI committee with representatives from wireless operators, governments 
and equipment manufactures (Funk and Methe, 2001). Given the company’s international 
ambitions, the firm changed its approach for 3G and technology standardization alliances have 
been instrumental to its efforts to proliferate the 3G WCDMA technology and 4G technologies 
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as de facto regional and global wireless standards (Ratliff, 2002). Specifically, NTT DoCoMo 
formed a constellation with mainly Nokia and Ericsson that successfully proliferated WCDMA 
in competition with a US constellation proliferating the IS95 standard in the European ETSI 
standardization committees formed by European governments to choose a single European 3G 
wireless transmission standard (UMTS) in late 1997. The constellation refined NTT DoCoMo’s 
WCDMA technology by deploying GSM as technology interface instead of the ISDN as 
originally planned. The compromise was driven by Nokia and Ericsson’s specialization in GSM, 
their vulnerability to the emergence of a 3G dominant standard non-compatible with GSM, and 
NTT DoCoMo’s need for critical mass and political connections for their endeavour (Funk and 
Methe, 2001). Thereby, NTT DoCoMo co-opted the emergence of competing technology 
standards from the constellation members by turning potential competitors into partners (Doz 
and Hamel, 1998). Thus, technology risk diversification occurred not though multiple R&D 
alliances, but multiple partners within one R&D constellation. 
 
Wireless transmission standard followers 
Outside domain of NTT DoCoMo, more clear-cut illustrations of technology risk diversification 
related to wireless transmission technologies can be found. South Koreas leading wireless 
operator, SK Telecom, has acquired 3G licenses both for CDMA2000 and WCDMA networks, 
and while current MMS services run on CDMA2000 1x ED-VO, UBS Warburg expects initial 
rollouts of WCDMA networks to commence in 2003 (Global Wireless, 2001; Electronic 
Engineering Times, 2001; UBS Warburg, 2002). Thus, risk diversification applies better to 
technology followers (i.e. SK Telecom) than technology leaders setting industry standards (i.e. 
NTT DoCoMo) in transmission standards. In contrast, network infrastructure and handset 
vendors while holding expertise in only a few transmission technologies, spread their product 
portfolio across multiple trajectories by means of e.g. multi-band handsets to be able to supply 
dominant design technology. Indeed, global vendors must be well positioned in multiple 
trajectories to compete effectively. For instance, global network leader Ericsson acquired 
Qualcomm’s CDMA infrastructure business in May 1999 to complement its strong position in 
the competing 3G standard WCDMA (Deloitte, 2001). 
 
3.4.3 R&D/Capability risks 
The alliance portfolio framework’s third diversifiable risk class concerns capability 
accumulation risks that stem from the uncertainty inherent to innovation. The risk mediates 
between the initially intended R&D output and the ultimate R&D alliance outcome. The 
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riskyness of alliance based R&D stems both from the uncertainty of R&D itself (Teece, 1996), 
and the uncertainty of R&D alliance outcomes due to alliance dynamics (Doz, 1996). Thus, 
whereas technology and market risks relate to R&D outcomes such as new technologies and 
products, the capability risks relates to the joint R&D process. More specifically, the uncertainty 
concerns whether the partners will achieve their joint goals together.  
 
Sources of R&D uncertainty include the tacitness of knowledge underlying many innovative 
efforts (Kogut and Zander, 1992). The complex tacit knowledge component increases along 
March’s dichotomy of (1) the exploration of new possibilities through experimentation 
processes and (2) the exploitation of existing competencies through refinement and extension 
processes reflected e.g. in the choice between inventing a new technology or the refinement of 
an existing one (March, 1991; Nonaka, 1994). March (1991) agues that returns from exploration 
are systematically less certain, have longer time horizons, and often negative as opposed to 
always positive for exploitation. Similarly, Iansiti (2000) argues that increasing radicalness of 
innovation increases the required numbers of parallel experiments. Innovation targeting 
embedded technologies resulting from technology convergence of previously unrelated 
technology fields also has highly uncertain outcomes (Hamel and Doz, 1996). 
 
Capability risks also stem from the R&D alliance itself in terms of initial conditions, the 
interfirm processes and governance structures that are setup to enact the joint R&D project. As 
for the processes Hamel and Doz (1996) argue that the more tacit, embedded and systemic the 
involved assets are, the more co-practice (i.e. joint interaction) is essential. Teece (1992) argues 
that innovation of increasingly complex technological assets requires operational coordination 
granting access to complementary assets, coupling of the project team to users and suppliers, 
coordination of technical standards, and the establishment of the necessary connections to other 
relevant technology assets. The latter include prior technologies as innovation is a cumulative 
process, complementary technologies to integrate and consider system interdependencies, and 
lastly to enabling technologies. Moreover, to setup such processes relation- and transaction 
specific investments such as upfront investments in specialized equipment, training and 
dedication of human resources are required to enable the generation of relational rents, which 
increases the stakes at risk (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The inherent uncertainties of the complex 
interorganizational processes can only partly be mitigated through efficient governance 
structures. Oxley point to hazads stemming from “difficulties in adequately specifying payoff-
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relevant activities, monitoring the execution of prescribed activities and/or enforcing contracts 
through courts” (1997:389).  
 
The capability risks of R&D alliances often underlie the high alliance failures rates, and the 
managerial complexity makes inadequate management of alliance evolution rather than 
insufficient business fundamentals a frequent failure cause (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Arino and 
Doz, 2000). Thus, given the high uncertainty implied by R&D itself, complex 
interorganizational processes and incomplete contracts, there exists ample indication that joint 
R&D is a risky business. Management of the uncertainty through efficient individual alliance 
management and successful risk diversification across a number of similar R&D alliances 
determine whether the partnering firms can achieve their joint objectives together. 
  
Wireless service application development 
In wireless telecommunications, the number of R&D alliances is increasing as a result of e.g. the 
convergence between telecom, IT and media industries, increasingly complex technologies and 
the rapid pace of development (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1998; OECD, 2000). Consequently, 
capability risks are increasingly important to manage. Again, NTT DoCoMo portfolio of service 
application alliances presented previously in this paper provides illustration of the phenomenon. 
While NTT DoCoMo also engages in multiple R&D alliance with e.g. wireless infrastructure 
and wireless handset vendors that illustrate capability risk diversification, the discussion is kept 
on service application alliances to clarify the interplay between simultaneous portfolio 
management of a R&D alliance class according to multiple sources of risk diversification.  
 
To recapture, the company has formed R&D alliances in multiple service fields and in most 
cases with several partners within each field. Market risk diversification was argued to influence 
the breath of service fields (i.e. car services, multimedia, payment services, corporate solutions 
and more) following uncertainty of commercial uptake of different applications of wireless 
technology to converging industries. Moreover, market risk diversification was argued to 
influence the formation of multiple R&D alliances within the same service field to diversify 
across product configuration variations. Indeed, however, in explaining the latter capability risk 
diversification suggests that multiple R&D alliances are forged to diversify the uncertainty 
related to the R&D process and alliance-type risks jeopardizing the successful completion of 
joint objectives. NTT DoCoMo’s three multimedia distribution technology alliances illustrate 
this point. 
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NTT DoCoMo’s multimedia alliances with IBM, HP and Packet-Video 
In 2000 and 2001, NTT DoCoMo formed three R&D alliances to develop multimedia 
distribution technologies with IBM, Hewlett-Packard and US Packet-Video, a multimedia 
software house, respectively. From December 2000 to September 2001, the IBM alliance 
developed a technology for compiling excerpts ("digests") of video content according to user-
specified keywords (e.g. a football players name) and then stream the content to the user's 
mobile phone (e.g. clips with the player). This technology is complementary to the larger scopes 
of the HP and Packet-Video alliances that both develop full-scale video-streaming distribution 
platform systems. Since capability risk diversification is most powerful for R&D alliances with 
similar scopes the two other alliances become of interest. In January 2001, the Packet-Video 
alliance initiated R&D on a video distribution technology platform for both live and archeived 
content for NTT DoCoMo’s 3G FOMA service. By September 2001 the two partners formed a 
consortium with 32 other companies to develop and study marketability of service applications 
to be delivered on the technology platform. As soon as April 2002, NTT DoCoMo launched a 
trial service dubbed FOMA V-live featuring music, sports, highlights, news, tourist information, 
English conversation lessons, security services and investor relation tools that users can 
download or stream. Based on a successful trial period NTT DoCoMo recently announced that 
the FOMA V-live service will be commercially launched nationwide in Japan in May 2003. Just 
a month before the Packet-Video alliance was formed, NTT DoCoMo and Hewlett-Packard had 
joined hands to develop multimedia delivery and network applications for 3G and 4G networks. 
In this case, DoCoMo teamed up with a streaming and server technology expert to develop 
similar systems to those pursued by the Packet-Video alliance. By September 2002, the Hewlett-
Packard alliance announced that future generation multimedia content delivery system 
particularly strong in streaming of large-volume content such as video had been developed 
integrating effective management of transmission infrastructure based on HPs capabilities. 
Thereby, NTT DoCoMo has created a second option on multimedia delivery technology and 
thereby diversified capability risks. 
 
NTT DoCoMo’s Corporate solution partners 
Apart from market risk diversification, the enterprise software alliances with 80 software 
developers and three global software integrators (SAP, IBM Lotus, and Oracle) also offers 
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capability risk diversification as more options are created for similar R&D projects. Thus, in 
case of alliance failure, NTT DoCoMo may still achieve successful application development 
with other partners. 
 
It is noteworthy that the underlying correlation of R&D alliance outcomes arguably is less solid 
in the case of capability risk diversification compared to the two other risk classes. Whereas 
causality drives correlation of R&D alliance outcomes for market and technology risks, there is 
no diversifiable causal correlation between the success and failure of independent R&D 
alliances. Although one correlation source would be the partnering firm’s alliance capabilities, 
such correlation improves project success rates for all R&D alliances and hence diversification 
considerations are irrelevant (instead since alliance capabilities can be leveraged across multiple 
R&D alliances to improve average success rates they constitute a synergy source as explained 
later in this paper). Following Modern Portfolio Theory, however, causality is no requirement to 
establish correlation between asset outcomes. Moreover, given the need for large-scale 
experimentation in radical R&D, intuitively speaking, the capability risks would be diversifiable 
through several similar R&D alliances. Hence, the nature of correlation is not causal, but builds 
on the simple notion that provided a type of R&D alliance has for instance 20% success rates, 
the platform firm can diversify capability risk through a portfolio of five similar R&D alliances. 
 
3.5 Portfolio synergies 
This section elaborates and operationalizes the second managerial lever, portfolio synergies. The 
approach is slightly different from the approach used for risk diversification. In the latter, an 
exhaustive list of three risks was identified and in-depth theoretical backgrounds and empirical 
evidence were instrumental to illustrate and operationalize each of the three risk classes. The 
previously reviewed antecedents to alliance portfolio synergies and the corporate diversification 
literature on related diversification revealed that the numerous sited synergies were quite diverse 
in nature, and thus, more difficult to produce an exhaustive taxonomy of. For instance, the 
review gave indication to internal portfolio synergies, external portfolio synergies, synergies 
accrued from economies of scale, and synergies accrued from economies of scope on both the 
supply-side and demand-side. Thus, instead of proposing an exhaustive taxonomy of specific 
portfolio synergies, this paper introduces a search heuristic in terms of four levels in R&D 
alliance portfolios to guide alliance portfolio managers’ search for various types of portfolio 
synergies. The four levels in a multi-type R&D alliance portfolio are (1) synergies reaped across 
alliances with the same partner, (2) synergies reaped among same-type alliances, (3) synergies 
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reaped across a subset of alliance types, and (4) synergies reaped across the entire alliance 
portfolio. For each level, this section presents illustrative examples of valuable synergies each 
with a theoretical background to elevate the application of the examples to other contexts, and 
empirical evidence from NTT DoCoMo and the wireless telecom sector. The correlation 
premise for portfolio synergies (i.e. R&D alliance returns should positively correlated) controls 
the search for synergies at the four portfolio levels. 
 
3.5.1 Portfolio synergies across multiple alliances with the same partner (partner-specific) 
Three illustrative partner-specific synergies are identified for this first portfolio level. In general, 
these synergies take advantage of accumulated assets such as trust and interfirm routines across 
multiple alliances between the same partners. 
 
Repeated ties between NTT DoCoMo and Hewlett-Packard 
In R&D alliances, synergies are frequent in terms of new business ideas and collaborative 
opportunities generated by success in previous collaboration. Over time, thus, the scope of joint 
activities may increase as partnering firms experience efficient fulfilment of individual strategic 
objectives, successful conflict management supporting continued collaboration despite high 
uncertainties signifying R&D activities, and the accumulation of interfirm trust and partner-
specific absorptive capacity (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Doz, 1996; Arino and Doz, 2000; 
Arino and De la Torre, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; 
Reuer, Zollo and Singh, 2002). In such cases, R&D alliances with the same partner have 
improved stakes in make-or-buy decisions as previous alliances are factored into the equation.  
 
In December 2000, NTT DoCoMo and Hewlett Packard initiated a joint R&D effort to develop 
3G and 4G multimedia content delivery platform and network equipment enabling provision of 
large volumes of content such as movies and live video via the mobile Internet. By September 
2002, the R&D alliance announced successful completion of the platform and infrastructure 
such as management servers monitoring network traffic (Company press releases). Fuelled by 
high satisfaction with the joint collaboration and R&D outcome NTT DoCoMo shifted to HP as 
its preferred enterprise server vendor in replacement of former vendor SUN. 
 
Leveraging interfirm product development routines with handset and network vendors 
A strong argument in the individual alliance literature is the necessity of building 
interorganizational routines matching the strategic objectives of partnering firms to 
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accommodate the intended value creation (Dyer and Singh, 1998). For instance, alliance 
learning is argued to take place by design and carefull attention rather than through coincidence 
or random processes (Hamel, 1991; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997). Thus, interorganizational 
routines for joint R&D, product and technology development build for the initial R&D alliance 
between two partnering firms present a source of synergies, as established patterns of interaction 
may be leveraged across multiple R&D projects and future R&D alliances.  
 
To illustrate, NTT DoCoMo has engaged in long-lasting partnerships with handset and network 
infrastructure vendors and thereby reaped synergies from repeated transactions through 
established channels. Alliance partner inherited from parent NTT’s family include Japanese 
NEC and Matsushita. Since mid-1990s, repeated joint R&D has also been performed with 
international partners such as Ericsson. 
 
Leveraging initial equity investment in KPN Mobile across subsequent joint alliances 
Alliance governance mechanisms established with a R&D partner can be deployed across 
several R&D projects. Within the contractual governance literature, for instance, hostages such 
as equity investments in joint ventures or in-kind hostages in bilateral contracts are instrumental 
to align partner incentives and thereby obstruct opportunistic behaviour and motivate behaviour 
in favour of the joint objectives (Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998). In parallel, the relational governance literature suggests that 
accumulated interfirm trust and relational capital can be deployed across future alliances, which 
decreases the need for costly formal contractual governance mechanisms (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992; Gulati, 1995; Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
 
To illustrate, NTT DoCoMo has engaged in multiple non-equity alliances with its European 
partner Dutch KPN Mobile through their equity joint venture. Specifically, joint market access 
alliances have been formed with wireless operators in UK together with the Hong Kong partner 
Hutchison Whampoa (June 2000), and Italian TIM (January 2001). Through KPN Mobile, NTT 
DoCoMo also gained access and joint ownership to the partner’s existing market access 
alliances with other European and Asian wireless operators, namely E-Plus (Germany), KPN 
Orange (Belgium), Pannon GSM (Hungary), Telkomsel (Indonesia) and Ukraine Mobile 
Communication (Ukraine) (Company press releases). 
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 3.5.2 Portfolio synergies among same-type R&D alliances (R&D activity specific) 
Three illustrative examples of R&D alliance type-specific synergies are provided. In general, 
such synergies are reaped across R&D alliance performing similar activities and/or producing 
similar outputs. 
 
Critical mass for proliferation of the WCDMA technology standard 
Innovation research suggests that technological superiority alone does not determine the 
outcome of competitive standardization races among alternative technological trajectories 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1986, 1990). Standard agents’ proliferation of a standard may lead to 
high early adaptation of a technology that creates an early installed base and helps establishing 
the technology as the dominant design through network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
Indeed, GSM emerged as the 2G dominant design due to network externalities reaped from early 
adaptation causing lower costs and higher quality of wireless transmission systems and handsets 
driven by learning and scale economies for manufactures, and thereby offering improved 
performance and services for wireless operators (Funk and Methe, 2001; Davies and Brady, 
1998). 
 
As part of NTT DoCoMo’s efforts to proliferate its 3G W-CDMA transmission standard as the 
global de facto standard, from 1996 to 1999 the company formed bilateral technology alliances 
with Asian wireless operators in South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, and China. In this period, such technology alliances were also formed 
in Italy, Finland and Brazil (Company press releases). The technology alliances strategic scope 
was to exchange, enhance and test W-CDMA based experimental systems. At an aggregate 
level, the strategic outcome of these alliances was a substantial level of interest and commitment 
of most alliance partners to W-CDMA, and the specialization of technological and human 
resources into W-CDMA constituted an early installed base of the transmission technology. This 
outcome was leveraged in the standardization constellation formed by NTT DoCoMo with 
mainly Nokia and Ericsson that successfully proliferated WCDMA in competition with a US 
constellation proliferating the IS95 standard in the European ETSI standardization committees 
formed by European governments to choose a single European 3G wireless transmission 
standard (UMTS) in late 1997 (Funk and Methe, 2001). 
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Complementary R&D alliances with Sony and SEGA within mobile gaming 
The value of economies of scope to achieve product differentiation through complementary 
product mixes and leverage firm resources across similar products is firmly established in the 
strategic management literature (Porter, 1985; Chandler, 1990; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). 
In high-tech industries signified by converging technologies such scope economies is often 
inaccessible within the firm, as they require complementary assets held by firms in previously 
unrelated industries. Thus, multiple R&D alliances with such firms may enable the development 
of complementary products or technologies to reap economies of scope. 
 
Within mobile gaming, NTT DoCoMo has formed wireless application R&D alliances with the 
two global leaders, namely Sony Playstation and SEGA. By late 2000, gaming was already a 
key revenue driver (America’s Network, November 2000). In August 2000 NTT DoCoMo and 
Sony announced plans to link their blockbuster products - DoCoMo's i-mode Internet service 
enabled with Java for rich graphics and Sony's PlayStation game console to enable users to play 
the same game at home and outside (Reuters, 01.08.2000; Reuters, 29.01.2001). Shortly after, in 
February 2001, NTT DoCoMo announced a R&D alliance with a Playstation key competitor at 
the time, Japanese SEGA, offering its Dreamcast game console. This R&D alliance, however, 
aimed to fuse i-mode with SEGA’s NAOMI video arcade machines installed in arcade centers 
nationwide in Japan rather than SEGA’s home video game consoles (Company press releases). 
Thereby, the Sony and SEGA R&D alliances were complementary in pursuing NTT DoCoMo’s 
ubiquitous service strategy to increase the locations and settings in which wireless technologies 
are used (Natsuno, 2003).  
 
Best practice transfers in rolling out I-mode services on GPRS networks 
The sharing and transfer of strategic knowledge and technologies across R&D alliances 
pursuing similar objectives and therefore deploying similar resources in pursuing innovation 
targets may significantly improve alliances’ efficiency. The argument is paralleled by research 
on corporate diversification based synergies from deploying strategic assets across related 
business units and research on transfers of best practices within large firms (Markides and 
Williamson, 1996; Szulanski, 1996; Szulanski and Winter, 2002). In their seminal study of the 
Toyota knowledge sharing network, moreover, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) found ample evidence 
of valuable sharing of product and process technologies across similar suppliers. 
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NTT DoCoMo pursues internationalization through a global network of equity- and a few non-
equity market access alliances with overseas operators in Asia, Europe and US. These alliances 
comprise a significant R&D component concerned with the export of NTT DoCoMo 3G W-
CDMA and I-mode mobile Internet technology, which is challenged by the complexity of 
integrating NTT DoCoMo technologies and standards with overseas partners’ existing network 
infrastructure and expertise. One significant process synergy has been reaped from the 
development of an I-mode technology overlay that integrates the mobile Internet systems with 
overseas partners upgraded 2,5G GPRS networks. The overlay was required as I-mode was 
initially developed for Japan’s 2G proprietary standards PDC that is non-compatible with GSM 
and GPRS. Accumulated expertise in extending GPRS networks with I-mode infrastructure and 
an increasingly standardized technology overlay has significantly decreased I-mode roll-out 
times overseas reflecting a valuable learning curve at the level of the alliance class. For instance, 
for Taiwanese partner KG Telecom a I-mode license agreement was concluded by June 2001 
and I-mode services were launched 12 months after, whereas the time-span for German partner 
E-plus was only from January 2002 to March 2002. In July 2002, the I-mode consulting firm 
was established to offer technological support for rollouts and operation of I-mode to European 
partners. This unit thereby facilitates portfolio synergies within the alliance class and parallels 
the operations management consulting division at Toyota deployed to leverage accumulated 
experience and problem-solving skills (UBS Warburg, 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; 
Company press releases; Reuters, 16.07.2002). Another indicative example of such portfolio 
synergies within one alliances class include leverage of best practices in joint R&D with handset 
providers and network vendors accumulated through the long-lasting ties with NTT family 
members such as NEC and Matsushita (Anchordoguy, 2001). 
 
3.5.3 Portfolio synergies across a subset of alliance types (~related diversification) 
R&D alliance complementarities and interdependencies also exist across different types of R&D 
alliances, but not necessarily all types of R&D alliances in a specific portfolio. Below several 
illustrations are provided from NTT DoCoMo. 
 
Filling multiple resource gaps through platform leadership 
In high-tech and rapidly changing industries, platform firms often face multiple and 
interdependent capability gaps due to rapid technological development, system 
interdependencies and technology complexity that it cannot fill alone or with or single R&D 
partners (Booz, Allen, Hamilton; 2000; Teece, 1996). Consequently, the platform firm’s 
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innovation targets convert into an R&D alliance portfolio consisting of several R&D alliance 
classes each with unique strategic intents and R&D objectives in terms of technologies, products 
and/or processes. The composition and coordination across subsets of these R&D alliance types, 
then, becomes crucial to orchestrate innovation and sustain platform leadership. NTT DoCoMo 
provides substantial evidence of synergies that reflect such orchestration.  
 
The service application alliances outlined previously develop new service platform features for 
e.g. the wireless Internet service I-mode and the new multimedia platform M-stage targeted for 
3G wireless telecommunications and PDAs. These platform enhancements benefit the service 
features available for another alliance-type, namely content providers of internet information 
and multimedia content. For instance, the java enabled i-appli and location-based i-area features 
for i-mode allows content providers to commercially offer richer and more complex wireless 
content (Nielsen and Mahnke, 2003). To reap synergies between application development and 
content provision, hence, the technological potential achievable through application alliance and 
the commercial potential achievable through content alliances must be coordinated. A related 
synergy is reaped between application alliances and R&D alliances with handset and network 
infrastructure vendors. Specifically, the systemic interdependencies between wireless services 
and enabling technological infrastructure and supportive handsets equipped with new 
application features necessitate technological integration of standards, applications and enabling 
devices such as colour displays and java-enabled handset browsers across technologies and 
products that are developed in different R&D alliance classes. Thus, NTT DoCoMo leverages its 
flagship position by diffusing for instance new wireless applications to handset alliances to spur 
development of supportive handsets (Natsuno, 2003). Likewise, existing ties with handset and 
infrastructure vendors are leveraged with overseas market access alliances. For instance, NEC 
and Panasonic are the key suppliers of I-mode handsets launched during 2002 and 2003 in 
European markets such as Germany, Netherlands, France and Belgium (Reuters, 17.04.2003; 
www.nttdocomo.com) 
 
International leverage of network assets 
Through its international expansion, NTT DoCoMo deploys jointly developed assets in overseas 
markets, and thereby reaps portfolio synergies from the R&D alliances in which the assets were 
developed and the overseas alliances. NTT DoCoMo reaps economies of scale for handset and 
infrastructure production to overseas markets by keeping its regular vendors during 
internationalization. For instance, given the increasing diversification of wireless handset 
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portfolios the thumb rule of 1 million handsets being the threshold for scale economies in 
handset production is more easily achieved across numerous markets with large aggregated 
customer bases (Economist 30.03.2002). Also, NTT DoCoMo’s experience in building up an 
wireless data market in Japan and adapting new wireless offerings to a country’s specific 
customer demographics and preferences, as well as its business model for wireless Internet 
involving the management of a vast web of content providers can be leveraged across its market 
access alliances (Telecommunications International, February 2001, Natsuno, 2003). Lastly, the 
standardization efforts pursued through standardization alliances eases the replication of NTT 
DoCoMo’s proprietary technologies in overseas markets due to improved compatibility and 
interfaces. 
 
3.5.4 Portfolio synergies across the entire alliance portfolio (alliance choice specific) 
The last level within the domain of alliance portfolio management concerns synergies realized 
across the entire alliance portfolio. To clarify, these synergies are not specific to individual 
partners (level 1), or to specific R&D alliance types (level 2), as well as specific to a subset of 
R&D alliance types (level 3). Rather, top-level portfolio synergies are specific to the make-or-
buy decision of hybrid organizational forms: R&D alliances. The platform firm’s overall 
alliance capabilities illustrate this. 
 
Recently, significant scholarly attention has been paid to firm’s alliance capabilities (see 
introduction). Overall alliance capabilities involve skills and knowledge in searching partnering 
firms, as well as forming, designing and managing R&D alliances over time (Kale, Dyer and 
Singh, 2001). Such capabilities are accumulated through alliance experience and careful 
attention to systematically collect, interpret and diffuse alliance experience within an 
organization (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Through its extensive alliance strategy inherited from 
parent NTT, NTT DoCoMo has had the opportunity to accumulate such general alliance 
capabilities (Anchordoguy, 2001; Kodama, 2001). 
 
4. Managerial value and implications 
This section concludes the paper by outlining the managerial value of the alliance portfolio 
management framework and guidelines on how to implement portfolio analysis and selection 
based on the two managerial levers.  
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Overall, the paper contents that the framework adds value by improving R&D alliance 
portfolios’ risk-return properties by means of increasing R&D alliance portfolio returns through 
reaping synergies and reducing R&D alliance portfolio risks through risk diversification. To 
develop credible managerial guidelines to capture the value creating potental held by this 
contention, a closer look at some of the common problems experienced by firms lacking proper 
alliance portfolio management is instrumental. Such problems include the previously noted 
findings by McKinsey (2002) that too often alliance portfolios grow into a random mix of 
ventures assembled over the years by various business units, that overall performance 
measurement of the portfolio is lacking, and that often overall alignment between a company’s 
overall competitive strategy and its alliance activities is missing. Similarly, in their seminal 
study of product development portfolio management practices Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 
(2001) found that inefficient portfolio management leads to collections of projects poorly 
aligned to the central firm’s strategy due to strategy process integration, the pursuit of low value 
projects due to lacking stop/go rules, accumulation of too many projects that collectively spread 
the firm’s resources too thin, and the pursuit of wrong projects chosen because of corporate 
politics and/or managers opinions and emotions. 
 
Evidently, sound alliance portfolio management is more than simply increasing a high-tech 
platform firm’s number of R&D alliances in response to the widely acknowledged advantages of 
flexible organizational forms to steer through turbulent industry environments, high-paced 
innovation, frequent competitive moves, and value chains too complex for one firm to go it 
alone (see background literature). Indeed, Deeds and Hill (1996) found an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the rate of new product development and the number of R&D alliances 
entered to access partners’ complementary assets in high-tech industries. In addition to the well-
known advantages of entering R&D alliances, the scholars found both diminishing returns 
caused by an increased likelihood of entering new alliances with only marginal contributions, 
and negative returns caused increased risk of malperformance of alliance formation and 
management (i.e. alliance capabilities are scarce resources) (see also Keil, 2000). In a sample of 
132 biotechnology firms, the study calculated the average “optimal number” of alliances to be 
27, while stressing that the number itself is highly dependent on firm specific factors and thus 
not generalizable. In parallel, Brealey, Myers and Markus (1995) argue that for financial 
portfolio management, effective risk diversification is typically achieved with investments in 20 
different stocks. Moreover, with increasing alliance numbers, the risks of overlapping scopes 
and partner conflicts also increase. Thus, principles for alliance portfolio management must 
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enable mangers to make consistently good portfolio decisions on which R&D alliances to enter, 
which R&D alliances to terminate and which R&D alliances to change. Through such 
principles, ideally, the firm’s set of relationships are managed as a portfolio rather than a set of 
discrete contracts. Resources are allocated strategically according to each alliance’s value to the 
portfolio, and criteria for regular performance reviews of both individual alliance and alliance 
portfolio performance are established (Deloitte, 2001).  
 
So how does the alliance portfolio management framework create value for managers in 
developing such sound principles and procedures? Firstly, the framework must be placed within 
the high-tech platform firms strategic planning process to ensure overall strategic alignment. 
Traditionally, top management periodically formulates a firm’s overall competitive strategy (e.g. 
Grant, 2003) and in high-tech and turbulent industries, technology is a major driving force the 
competitive strategy. The strategically crucial accumulation and management of technology 
assets is managed through the firm’s technology strategy. Thus, Burgelman and Rosenbloom 
(1989) advance the core argument that a firm’s technology strategy is formulated against the 
background of two analytical pillars; (1) the firm’s competitive strategy in terms of the 
necessary enhancement and augmentation of existing technical capabilities and radical 
development of new technical capabilities, and (2) the evolution of the firm’s technology 
capabilities, which to a large degree is determined by the exogenous technological development. 
The technology strategy materializes into innovation targets that set direction and priorities for 
the firm’s technology portfolio development, which is pursued through product and process 
R&D projects (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Iansiti, 2000). Following R&D project portfolio 
management considerations (Chien, 2002; Cooper et al, 2001), make-or-buy choices are made 
for each R&D project on whether to execute it through internal R&D, M&A or a R&D alliance. 
Increasingly, for high-tech platform firms, these make-or-buy decisions favour R&D alliances, 
making them a key vehicle to pursue the innovation targets set in the technology strategy, and 
thereby support the firm’s competitive strategy (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 1999; Narula, 2001; 
Vanhaverbeke, Duysters and Noorderhaven, 2002). At this point in the top-down planning 
process, the alliance portfolio management framework applies to all R&D projects executed 
through R&D alliances. Clearly, it is and should be highly interdependent on the preceding 
planning stages. However, to simplify the analysis, the framework assumes that the considered 
R&D activities are exclusively carried out through R&D alliances, because integration with 
internal or acquired R&D is left for future research. Thereby, the framework ignores e.g. 
diversification of three risk classes jointly by internal and external R&D projects, and e.g. 
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internally accrued portfolio synergies. Early evidence on such integration suggests that R&D 
project portfolio management across all make-or-buy modes requires the ability to coordinate 
competencies and combine knowledge across corporate boundaries (Loronzoni and Lipparini, 
1999). Especially in high-tech industries, it also requires the ability to manage multiple time 
scales such as the partners’ individual product and technology life-cycles, the R&D project’s 
life-cycle and the alliance’s life-cycle to ensure that the alliance is ripe to perform the planned 
joint activities (Vilkamo and Keil, 2003). 
 
Having placed the framework within the strategic planning process, the paper concludes by 
explicating the two managerial levers’, risk diversification and portfolio synergies, managerial 
value. The below table contrasts the objectives pursuable through individual R&D alliances and 
R&D alliance portfolios based on the empirical illustrations from NTT DoCoMo presented 
previously. Thereby, the complementarity of the two managerial layers (i.e. individual vs. 
portfolio) and the need to manage R&D alliances as portfolios to reach alliances’ full potential is 
sustained. 
Managerial lever Individual R&D alliance R&D alliance portfolios Case 
Risk diversification   
1. Market risks   
- New service 
development 
Jointly develop one new 
service 
Develop multiple and 
different-type services, 
hedge market risks and 
end with killer 
applications 
11 service types: 
graphics, video tech, 
video app, portal, 
gaming, corporate, 
physical, advertising, 
car, e-payment, identify 
2. Technology risks   
- Wireless transmission 
standard 
Jointly develop a 
wireless transmission 
standard combining 
more initial trajectories 
into one trajectory 
Access and/or 
participate in competing 
transmission standards, 
hedge technology risks 
and end with dominant 
technology 
DoCoMo: W-CDMA. 
SK Telecom: W-CDMA 
and cdma2000. 
Ericsson: W-CDMA and 
cdma2000. 
 
3. R&D/Capability risks   
- New service 
development 
Jointly develop one new 
service 
Develop multiple similar-
typed services, hedge 
R&D/Capability risks and 
end with at least one 
service of the desired 
kind 
8 service types each 
with between 2 and 83 
different partners. 
Multimedia tech: IBM, 
HP and Packet Video. 
Corporate: 83 partners 
Portfolio synergies   
1. Alliances with same partner  
- New ideas and 
opportunities 
Jointly pursue one 
business idea 
Through successful 
collaboration build 
relational capital, expand 
scope of collaboration 
and launch new 
alliances. 
DoCoMo and HP: 
multimedia distribution 
platform and preferred 
server vendor contract 
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- Interfirm routines Establish interfirm 
routines for one R&D 
project 
Leverage established 
interfirm routines for new 
R&D projects 
DoCoMo and 
handset/network 
vendors: joint product 
development routines 
- Economic hostages Invest equity in R&D 
alliance performing one 
R&D project 
Leverage initial equity 
investment across 
subsequent alliances. 
DoCoMo and KPN 
mobile: 1 initial equity JV 
and 5 subsequent non-
equity alliances 
2. Same-type R&D alliances   
- Critical mass for 
technology standard 
proliferation 
Obtain one supporting 
partner for technology 
standard 
Obtain multiple 
supporting partners for 
technology standard 
DoCoMo formed 11 
alliances with operators 
to create critical mass 
for W-CDMA 
- Complementary 
products and services 
Develop one new 
service 
Develop complementary 
products and services 
constituting unique 
package 
Within mobile gaming 
DoCoMo with Sony for 
consoles and Sega for 
arcades 
- Best practice transfers Develop practice for one 
R&D alliance 
Leverage best practices 
across subsequent 
similar-type alliances 
I-mode overlay for 
GPRS developed with 
first overseas I-mode 
partners leverages for 
subsequent alliances 
3. Across subset of alliance types 
- Fill multiple innovation 
gaps 
Pursue one innovation 
target 
Pursue multiple, diverse 
and complementary 
innovation targets 
Synergies between 
application platform 
development and (1) 
content provision, and 
(2) handsets.  
Handset partners 
leveraged for overseas 
market alliances. 
- International leverage 
of strategic network 
assets 
No leverage across 
geographical markets 
Leverage network 
assets across multiple 
geographical markets 
DoCoMo leverages 
economies of scale from 
global handset sales, 
experience to build 
infrastructure and 
wireless market in 
Japan, business models, 
and established 
technology standards 
4. Across entire portfolio   
- Alliance capabilities Partner-specific alliance 
know-how acquired 
Accumulation of alliance 
management best 
practices across multiple 
and diverse alliances 
DoCoMo renowned for 
alliance capabilities build 
on comprehensive 
alliance portfolio 
Source: own creation    
 
Lastly, guidelines on how to implement the managerial levers are presented. Based on 
interviews with 30 leading companies and a questionnaire with 205 respondents, Cooper et al 
(2001) found that for product development portfolio management firms use financial methods 
such as NPV (77,3%), business strategy based prioritizing (64,8%), bubble diagrams or portfolio 
maps (40,6%), scoring models (37,9%), and checklists (20%). However, the choice among these 
valuation methods and the like highly depends on the analytical tools used for individual 
alliance management, because these determine information available for alliance portfolio 
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management. Best practice studies suggest that such existing individual alliance analytical tools 
at best include business case studies, cash flow analysis, partner assessments, and alliance 
assessments based on real options (Kale et al, 2001; Reuters, 2003; McKinsey, 2002; 
Williamson, 1999; Luehrman, 1998). 
 
A simple but disciplined approach to implement the alliance portfolio management framework 
would be to first list all potential candidates for both risk diversification and portfolio synergies 
in a table like the above, to secondly value and prioritize all potental candidates, and lastly 
implement choosen candidates. To map candidates for risk diversification, each of the three risk 
classes are analyzed separately. For market risks, the corporate strategy defines which product 
and service fields the company wish to compete in, and detailed external analysis of existing and 
future product and service categories and configurations yield a list of potential candidates. For 
technology risks, the external technology environment is analyzed for competing technology 
trajectories, which yields a list of potential candidates. For R&D/capability risks, the associated 
uncertainty of R&D is estimated and alternative partners identified. Similarly, for portfolio 
synergies, each of the four portfolio levels are systematically scanned synergy opportunities 
yielding a long list of potential synergy candidates. The second step involves prioritizing of the 
list of alliance portfolio management initiatives. For risk diversification, the risk’s severity (i.e. 
value), likelihood, ease to implement and ease to recover from are estimated e.g. on a numerical 
scale. Similarly, for portfolio synergies, each potential candidate’s value, likelihood, ease to 
implement now and ease to implement later are estimated also on a simple numerical scale. 
Lastly, the most promissing and valuable candidates are choosen based on a weighing of the 
above dimensions and implementation programmes are crafted to achieve the promisses of 
alliance portfolio analysis (inspired by Williamson, 1999; Goold and Campbell, 1998). 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper’s primary objective is to enhance managerial guidance available on the emergent 
discipline of alliance portfolio management that plays an increasingly crucial role in high-tech 
platform firms’ simultaneous management of their substantial, diverse and often interdependent 
single-partner and multi-partner R&D alliances. A managerial framework is proposed to this end 
based on analogue reasoning from Modern Portfolio Theory, early contributions to alliance 
portfolio management research, and empirical evidence from the leading Japanese wireless 
operator NTT DoCoMo. In particular, it is argued that two managerial levers are valuable 
principles at the portfolio level of alliance management to complement the parallel individual 
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management of the focal firm’s R&D alliances. Risk diversification is developed and illustrated 
as means to diversify and thereby reduce an alliance portfolio’s total risks in terms of three 
critical risk classes associated with R&D alliances; market risks, technology risks, and 
R&D/capability risks. Likewise, portfolio synergies are developed and illustrated as means to 
increase an alliance portfolio’s total returns by exploring synergies at four distinct portfolio 
levels. The proposed framework is integrated with the focal high-tech platform firm’s overall 
competitive strategy and technology strategy formulation processes by linking the firm’s 
innovation targets with the two managerial levers. While initial steps are made to integrate the 
framework with individual alliance management best practices, future research should aim to 
combine the complementary managerial disciplines further.  
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